Events Archive
U.S. Charge d’Affaires Fernandez’s remarks before the Future Trends Foundation for Strategic Studies and Dialogue, November 29, 2007 at Friendship Hall
The policy of the United States towards Sudan is an often misunderstood subject, especially inside Sudan, and I want to thank the Future Trends Foundation for Strategic Studies and Dialogue, for inviting me to speak here tonight on this subject. Although I will say some critical things about the Sudanese Government in the course of my remarks, I want to make it clear that the totality of these thoughts are offered in a positive, constructive spirit inspired by the June 6, 2006 remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice who said “our policy toward Africa is rooted in partnership not paternalism, in doing things with the people of Africa not for the people of Africa.” I fervently believe that optimistic vision can be achieved, even with Sudan. I believe that there are many voices of good will and wisdom inside the senior levels of the Sudanese Government that would welcome such a new relationship.
Sudan is the Bush Administration’s top priority on the African continent. It is even more important than our other regional priorities such helping post-conflict countries like Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and strengthening very good relations with key sub-regional states such as South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. President Bush personally noted his deep concern in his speech before the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2007 that “in Sudan, innocent civilians are suffering repression.”
American policy towards Sudan is nuanced, complex and multi-dimensional. The United States uses three instruments to implement our policy in Sudan: sanctions, humanitarian and development assistance, and diplomacy. There are, of course, other options, but the Bush Administration has not decided to use them at this time. In Sudan, we seek to secure peace and democracy countrywide and support the Sudanese people to implement the NCP-SPLM Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Darfur, U.S. humanitarian assistance helps meet basic needs and provides protection to vulnerable people. We will continue to support accountability for serious violations of human rights. The United States also seeks to continue to facilitate political dialogue and negotiation among the contending parties in Darfur under the United Nations/African Union framework and supports the early introduction of a credible, effective peacekeeping force leading to a sustainable peace, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1769.
American engagement with Sudan is not new. In the mid-1980s, the United States provided life saving emergency food assistance to Western Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan, to the extent that local people called this “Dura Reagan” or Reagan Sorghum, after the American President of the day. According to the UN, the United States provided 80% of the food aid during this crisis, which affected 5 million Sudanese in Western Sudan. In the 1990s, the United States again provide massive humanitarian food aid through Operation Lifeline Sudan to hundreds of thousands of Sudanese suffering from displacement, war and famine as a result of the fighting. When I see criticism from some corners about US policy in this country, I always remember this – that there are literally hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens alive today because of the work of the international community, and especially the United States, in helping Sudan through the years. One must state the obvious, of course, that these people – many of them in the South and other marginalized areas – were faced by successive Sudanese governments that wouldn’t or couldn’t help them.
US assistance to Sudan today is massive. In the just concluded fiscal year 2007, the amount totaled $778,000,000. This is the largest assistance program in Africa by far and one of the largest in the world. About $150 million of this is support for peacekeeping operations in the South and in Darfur and this amount will increase greatly with the arrival of UNAMID in Darfur. About a third of that amount goes as food aid for Darfur and the South – I just visited a World Food Program warehouse in El Fasher and saw Sudanese laborers loading sacks of American sorghum and American vegetable oil into WFP trucks for distribution. How does this assistance translate to the reality on the ground?
The United States currently supplies more than half of the donor funding for development activity in South Sudan to support the CPA. It is the major donor for democracy and governance activities than span elections, public administration capacity building, political party development and strengthening civil society participation. This also includes being the major donor for infrastructure focused on the primary economic arteries in the South and sustaining thousands of livelihoods there through recovery programs. We are building schools and setting up local governments where no real infrastructure existed. Through the US Agency for International Development, the American people provide over half the funding needed for daily humanitarian assistance to more than two million internally displaced persons in Darfur. The 355,000 metric tons of US provided food feeds more than 4 million Sudanese each year.
American sanctions were first imposed after the current government seized power in a military coup in 1989, overthrowing a democratically-elected government. Sudan’s support for terrorism in the 1990s and after that, the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, have caused sanctions to remain in place. I know that this aspect of American policy is quite controversial here and often misunderstood. Some Sudanese tell me quite vividly and passionately of the great hardship it has caused, while others boast that it has had no affect whatsoever and don’t care what the United States does. I believe that we should look at sanctions as an opportunity to work together in those large parts of Sudan, very poor and marginalized areas that are specifically exempted from sanctions.
I would just add that we will always choose principle over commerce and business as usual. I would personally like to see that be the gauge for American foreign policy everywhere and not just in Sudan. Sudan’s oil reserves were discovered and first exploited by the United States, by Chevron, during a brief and rare decade of peace in Sudan as a result of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The United States walked away from oil in Sudan for ethical reasons of principle – it was and still is the right thing to do.
Diplomacy has been the third instrument of our policy in Sudan. Four years of intensive U.S. engagement culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), witnessed by Secretary of State Powell. Similar positive engagement with the Sudanese Government – in this instance through intelligence cooperation – has proved vital in the struggle against international terrorism. The United States exerted similar efforts to ensure the passage of the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja. Unfortunately, as the main signatory from the Darfur rebels recently pointed out, much of that agreement has not been implemented and the violence and mass displacement continue in Darfur. American diplomacy was also prominent in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorizing the deployment of a Darfur peacekeeping force of nearly 26,000 personnel.
In an effort to further normalize relations, a new U.S. embassy compound is currently under construction in Khartoum. It would have been completed in 2008 but that is now pushed back until at least 2009, if not later. The new embassy would have enabled the United States to provide full visa operations in Sudan for the first time in a decade. It would also have led to enhanced relations in other fields. We are monitoring this issue closely to see where we will be in the near future on this important bilateral issue.
That is a general overview of American policy toward Sudan. I would now like to make some points, not so much about American policy, but about Sudanese policy – that is, our view of some policies practiced by the Sudanese Government.
In his recent book Darfur’s Sorrows: A History of Destruction and Genocide, the important scholar of contemporary Sudanese history, Dr. Martin W. Daly describes the tactics of the NCP-controlled government in 2004 as follows:
“In stalling; in prevaricating; milking propaganda value; setting one would-be mediator against another; raising legal technicalities; requiring time for consideration, research and consultations; drafting counter-proposals; protesting crowded calendars; and employing all the mumbo-jumbo of diplomacy when one side holds the advantage, the Sudanese government – with almost half a century of institutional memory gained from the “Southern problem” – was a past master” (page 290).
There are many who would believe that Professor Daly’s description rings all too true for those who have had this sort of negotiating experience with the Sudanese government. With the upcoming deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping forces, I am reminded of the English language saying, “be careful what you wish for.”
If the constant maneuvering of the Sudanese government on UNAMID composition, deployment, terms of operations, flexibility, transport, visas, customs, communications, housing, flight clearances, rules of engagement, and even helmet color, leads in the end to a hollow and ineffective force, the government of Sudan will have no one else to blame but themselves. If that is the goal of the government, this is a very dangerous gambit. If the possible future inability of this force to effectively fulfill its mandate is compromised, that will mean more suffering and death in Darfur, more instability in Sudan. It will mean that internally displaced persons and refugees will have no confidence to voluntarily return home, it will mean that rebel groups will be discouraged from laying down their arms and negotiating in good faith with unforeseen consequences for the country as a whole. If this dire outcome actually takes place, it will be because the Sudanese Government willed it so – not the UN or the US, or the Mossad, the Masons or the CIA.
This is not to say that the picture is entirely dark. There is real progress. The number of deaths in Darfur has decreased, and the health and nutrition factors for people in IDP camps have improved considerably over the dark days of 2004. This is because of the major financial commitment of the international community, working through NGOs and the UN, in cooperation with the Sudanese Government. The international peacekeeping force is very slowly but surely increasing its presence on the ground. The Sudanese Government recently was very helpful and pro-active in facilitating the move to Darfur of two additional African battalions as force protection for the Heavy Support Package.
But this question of responsibility is important. I was recently in Darfur and heard a senior official ask us for American help in rebuilding homes that had been burned and destroyed. I bit my tongue and reported back to Washington the request. I did not ask what was in my mind at the time which was, “why don’t those who burned these homes, who gave the orders for these actions, why don’t they rebuild what they have destroyed?” This is actually explicit in the text of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, in article 17, section 108 which says that “the first priority of implementing this Agreement is to address the needs of the war-affected areas, with special attention to displaced and war-affected persons, to provide the basic services and security needed to enable them to return to their livelihoods in safety and dignity. This chapter sets out principles for the restitution of property, to land and assistance for full reintegration to their former livelihood, including rights to land and compensation for losses or damages, or both, as a result of the conflict”.
It would be nice to say that this has happened but it hasn’t. Only last month, in early October 2007, according to the sole DPA signatory, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), units of the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militia attacked the town of Al-Muhajeria, creating thousands of more internally displaced persons. I want to make this clear that this is according to the one rebel faction which is part of the Sudanese Government, not the Americans or the West. The point I want to make is not to embarrass the Sudanese Government but to point to a basic truth which underlies the future of US-Sudanese relations: without real transformation, we will not see real improvement in the relations.
America’s priorities in Sudan: a peaceful and stable Darfur where IDPs and refugees can return home voluntarily, “in safety and dignity” as the DPA says; the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), especially the Protocol on Abyei (which the United States brokered in 2004), and transparent and democratic elections in 2009 – all these “American demands” are things which the Sudanese Government itself, and the National Congress Party in particular, have publicly committed to doing. The American Administration does not demand the fall of the regime, or the breakup of Sudan or the destruction of the North, the United States looks towards the Sudanese Government fulfilling the promises it has made in writing to its own people first and foremost, to the great Sudanese Nation.
Our belief is that Sudan’s transformation into a responsible, democratic state is essential for Sudan’s future. Building a widely accepted political framework that will gain the confidence of the people, wisely and transparently using valuable and fast depleting oil revenues, restoring the long torn social fabric of Sudanese society – these are the issues that should move all who are concerned with Sudan’s future and want to see the Sudanese people succeed.
This hope demands an emphasis on reconciliation and compensation. In Darfur, we must take the fears and hopes of IDPs into account if there is ever to be peace. The Arab tribes of Darfur, marginalized through lack of education and economic opportunity for so many decades, have a right to be heard as well by the international community. As many of you know, the historic fabric of peace and stability in Darfur for centuries was essentially the social compact between the Fur people and the Arab tribes. This has been torn and somehow this essential balance must be restored.
The tensions, fissures and contradiction which could threaten Sudan’s stability, progress and unity are not as a result of some foreign force or conspiracy but because of unresolved internal divisions and conflicts. In fact, constantly using the “foreign menace” as an “Uthman’s shirt” to distract public opinion is an old way for leaders worldwide to ignore the real problems that threaten a nation. It is not a Thai or Nepalese or Norwegian unit for Darfur which threaten Sudan’s sovereignty but the gap between millions of marginalized people and privileged elite. It is not the presence of CARE or OCHA or Oxfam which threaten Sudan but the continuing misery of over a million angry IDPs in camps who blame Khartoum for their suffering.
Today both the future of the country and the future of US-Sudanese relations stand at the same crossroads. As I have said several times to the Sudanese and Arab media, we stand at the edge of a real improvement in relations or a further deterioration. It can still go either way. One of the most destructive and foolish statements I sometimes here in Sudan is this: “it doesn’t matter what we do, the Americans will always be against us.” One of my predecessors, Ambassador Donald Petterson, quotes Sudanese officials as saying this to him over a decade ago in his book, Inside Sudan. First of all, what should matter is doing the right thing for the sake of the Sudanese people, keeping one’s promises to them. The truth is that Sudan has the very real possibility to make definitive strides towards breaking the cycle of violence and tyranny which has characterized much of Sudanese history. This was the promise of the CPA and I believe that this promise still lives. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not a perfect agreement but it is by far the best hope the Sudanese people have ever had for a better, more just and peaceful future. It is too important and too precious of an accomplishment to be allowed to fail.
I know that this gathering is also interested in the possibility of trade relations so I wanted to touch on this point. Obviously a better American economic relationship with Sudan would bring great benefits to the Sudanese people if for no other reasons that it would increase international competition for Sudanese products. For example, the United States is the world leader in technology for refining acidic, heavy petroleum such as heavily discounted Sudan’s Dar Blend which is just appearing on the international market. A more normal relationship which involved peace in Darfur and the South would enable American assistance to move from emergency humanitarian aid to more traditional development assistance. It is this type of American program that built American roads, developed agriculture, and brought scholarships and training to Sudan in past decades.
But it is hard for me to conceive that there would be any real possibility for a resumption in anything approaching normal economic relations without tangible breakthroughs on the pressing issues I have already mentioned – Darfur, CPA and democracy. A little bit of progress here and there, “one step forward and two steps back” as often seems to happen in Sudan, with the aggressive rhetoric that is sometimes heard will not substantively changed this equation. What will change it is to be bold and consistent for peace and for transformation, to be honest with the people of Sudan, to listen to the refugees and IDPs of Darfur with respect and consideration. That will catch the attention of the Americans and the admiration of the world.
I know something about the media and about public opinion in my 24 years in the diplomatic service. The United States is a real democracy and public opinion matters. The American people are deeply concerned by the suffering in Darfur – this is not some sort of conspiracy or trick but real concern and solidarity by ordinary Americans. The only way to change the negative image of Sudan in the United States is to create a new and positive image based on a transformed reality – Darfuri refugees voluntarily returning to their homes, political reconciliation between North and South, the language of peace rather than the language of war, real elections that engage the interest of the Sudanese people. Despite the difficulties, tragedies and setbacks, I am optimistic because I believe in the ability of the Sudanese people and their leaders to overcome all these obstacles. And I also believe that the American Administration has good will and the best intentions for Sudan.
This new spirit is not impossible nor even that difficult. But it requires a sincere act of will by the rulers of today’s Sudan – the NCP, the SPLM and Sudanese civil society and political life broadly defined. If a new Sudan emerges – not the “new Sudan” of a particular party – that truly and finally sets aside the grim ways of the past, it will discover the American people, with an open heart and sincere respect, ready to work with Sudan. With that new reality, all good things would indeed be possible and the great Sudanese people will be able to fulfill the tremendous promise and potential they have.
Thank you very much.